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Abstract
The benefits of dual apprenticeship programs are usually discussed in the context
of reducing structural unemployment rates, especially among the young. Related to
this, the long-run benefits of dual apprenticeship programs are extensively analyzed
in the literature. However, empirical evidence regarding the short-run effects of
the business cycle on the number of apprenticeships is scarce. In this paper, we
use panel-data at the German federal states level ranging from 1999 through 2012
to analyze the effects of the business cycle on the number of new apprenticeship
contracts. Using different sample periods and model specifications, we do not find
a robust and significant effect of the business cycle on apprenticeships. Hence, the
apprenticeship system seems to dampen the volatility of youth unemployment.
JEL classification: E32, I21, J63
Keywords: Economic Fluctuations, Education, Hiring, Unemployment
∗Corresponding Author: University of Bern, Schanzeneckstr. 1, Bern, Switzerland; and German In-
stitute for Economic Research (DIW), Research Cluster Macroeconomics and Financial Markets, Berlin,
Germany. Address: DIW, Mohrenstr. 58, D-10117, Berlin, Germany. Email: guido.a.baldi@gmail.com.
† Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht Berlin, Campus Lichtenberg, Alt-Friedrichsfelde 60, 10315
Berlin.
‡ German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, Germany. Address: DIW, Mohrenstr. 58,
D-10117, Berlin, Germany.
1
1 Introduction
While the economic literature extensively investigates the role of skill acquisition in the
context of long-run economic growth, the short-run relation between the business cy-
cle and skill-acquisition is much less understood (see e.g. Méndez and Sepúlveda 2012).
In this paper, we focus on one particular way of skill acquisition, namely the dual-
apprenticeship system, which is a market-driven form at the upper-secondary school
level. In this system apprentices have a contract with a firm and receive training both
at school and at the firm. Therefore, the number of new apprenticeship contracts de-
pends on the number of school graduates that are looking for an apprenticeship and the
number of apprenticeship contracts offered by firms. This form of education is mainly
present in countries from Continental and Northern Europe such as Germany, Switzer-
land, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. The influence of the business cycle
on the number of apprenticeship programs is a research question of high policy relevance
for countries where these programs play an important role. In countries like Germany,
Austria or Switzerland, at least half of primary and secondary school graduates start
an apprenticeship program. Thus, a large part of the young people in education can
potentially be affected by movements in output growth and the level of unemployment.
Our research is also of interest for countries, where dual-apprenticeships are less com-
mon. For example, dual-apprenticeship systems are nearly absent in Southern European
countries as well as in the UK and Ireland. Given that many of these countries are strug-
gling with high unemployment rates especially among the young, the EU Commission
(see e.g. European Commission 2012) advocates the implementation of apprenticeship
programs in these countries, based among others on the idea that such programs help
lower structural and cyclical unemployment among young people.
Since firms are naturally exposed to the business cycle, the number of apprenticeship
contracts they offer may depend on the economic stance. However, the sign of the relation
is far from clear. It will be positive if firms reduce the number of apprenticeship contracts
along with overall employment in a recession. Moreover, labor contract regulation is
normally stricter than for usual employees. A firm can only terminate a training contract
unilaterally for economic reasons. As a consequence, firms might be reluctant to hire
an apprentice if the business or economic stance is bad or if business expectations are
poor. On the other hand, the relation between the business cycle and the number of
apprenticeship contracts could also be negative, because apprentices constitute a cheap
low-skilled labor input for firms that might substitute for other unskilled workers in a
recession. In addition, hiring and training an apprentice can be seen as an investment by
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the firm. For example, firms might expect that the economy will have recovered by the
time the apprenticeship ends. In addition, apprentices may carry out parts of skilled as
well as unskilled work, which gives the firm flexibility in assigning tasks to apprentices.
Therefore, it is conceivable that output volatility can show either a positive or a negative
effect on the number of apprenticeship contracts.
The literature review by Brunello (2009) shows that the number of offered apprenticeship
contracts is usually lower during a recession. This implies that the decision on the number
of offered apprenticeship contracts is not qualitatively different from the general recruit-
ment strategy of firms (see e.g. Lindley 1975, Brunello and Medio 2001). Several papers
investigating different countries provide empirical evidence that an economic downturn or
periods of high unemployment lead to a lower number of offered apprenticeship positions.
Using firm-level data for the period from 1993 to 2003, Dietrich and Gerner (2007) find
a significant relation between short-term business expectations and offered apprentice-
ship contracts. An increase in the expected business volume by one percent raises the
number of apprenticeship contracts by 0.35 percent. For Norway, Askilden and Nilsen
(2005) show that the number of apprenticeship contracts decreases with employment.
Westergaard-Nielsen and Rasmussen (1999) find that firms’ demand for apprentices is
positively related to the demand for skilled labor in Denmark. For Switzerland, Schweri
and Müller (2008) and Mühlemann, Wolter and Wüest (2009) find a small positive ef-
fect of GDP growth on the firms’ propensity to train and on the apprenticeship ratio in
Switzerland. However, business cycle effects on apprenticeship training tend to be weaker
than on overall labor demand.
Our aim is to empirically investigate the sign of the average effect of the business cycle on
apprenticeship contracts for Germany. In our empirical analysis, we use data on newly
offered and concluded apprenticeship contracts at the level of the 16 German states
from 1999 through 2012. The federalistic nature of the German education system makes
such an analysis reasonable, since demographic developments, the industry structure
and also business cycles can vary considerably across the states. Based on the panel
structure of our data, our findings show that the estimated effect from income growth and
unemployment on the number of apprenticeship contracts is weak and hardly significant.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the characteristics of the German
apprenticeship system and compares it briefly to other countries. Section 3 describes the
data set used and the methodology for our estimations. The results of our estimations
are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusion.
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2 The German Apprenticeship System
In Germany, vocational training is attained by completing one of more than 300 programs
of officially recognized occupations in order to gain all competence of a skilled worker in
that field. In general, around one half of school graduates start vocational training each
year (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB) 2013a, Statistisches Bundesamt 2013).
There are three notable elements that make the German dual-apprenticeship system spe-
cial in an international context. One element is the corporate organization of the system:
the state, unions and employers jointly decide on the principles of apprenticeship. Second,
the education is dual, meaning that it consists of school-based and firm-based training
elements. The third element is the vocationalism of the system, i.e. the accumulation
of occupation-specific knowledge and skills. An apprenticeship system with these char-
acteristics is described as collectivistic, see e.g. Ebner and Nikolai (2010). Austria and
Switzerland have established similar systems as Germany.
The corporate organization is reflected in nationwide standardization of programs con-
cerning content and duration. Duration ranges from two to four years. The share of
firms fulfilling the requirements for dual-apprenticeship training is at a constant level of
about 59 % of German firms. The number of firms actively participating in apprentice-
ship training was substantially lower in 2012 with a share of 31 % of all firms, see e.g.
Hartung (2012).
The duality of the concept is the core element of vocational formation in Germany.
Every dual apprenticeship is based on a private-law contract between the apprentice
and the training firm for the apprenticeship. The contract automatically terminates
with completion of the training. The apprentices receive a standardized salary that
varies between different professions and sectors. During the course of an apprenticeship,
trainees switch between learning in vocational schools, which covers about 40 % of the
total training time, and working periods in the firm. During in-firm periods the trainees
undergo practical training and gather firm-specific knowledge (Biavaschi et al. 2012). All
apprenticeships end with a final exam issued by a central federal committee board.
A firm’s decision to employ apprentices depends on the benefits and costs of training
an apprentice. First, as trainees are skilled workers by the end of the apprenticeship,
firms can meet their need of specialized personnel over a medium-term time horizon.
In other words, apprenticeship helps to satisfy firms’ demand for skilled workers and
thereby retains their competitiveness. Second, training costs are an important factor as
well. There are, apart from providing the vocational schooling, no governmental subsidies
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for the training firms. Smaller firms face positive net costs from training due to larger
relative costs of providing workspace for apprentices. Still, some firms face negative net
costs, since apprentices’ wages are low compared to regular wages. Therefore, trainees
might be hired even if firms have no demand for specialists (Niederalt 2004). Moreover,
vocational training gives firms the opportunity to screen possible future employees who
additionally have gathered firm-specific knowledge.
Trainees have incentives to participate in the German apprenticeship system since it
provides the chance to cross the “first barrier” in the labour market more easily. Due
to the concept of vocationalism, apprentices are fully qualified workers by the end of
their training. This is a key factor for a gradual transfer from school to employment and
for long-run employment. According to Reinberg and Hummel (2005) participating in
vocational training considerably reduces the risk of unemployment. Fedorets and Spitz-
Oener (2011) show that human capital accumulated during vocational training is even
transferable between different occupations, so vocationalism does not inhibit flexibility.
The German apprenticeship market is closely connected with the regular labor market.
About 66 % of successful apprentices stay in the same firm, in which they completed
their apprenticeship. This can be seen as an indicator for a smooth transition from
education to regular employment (Hartung 2012). On the other hand, young adults with
poor school reports have severe problems to enter the labor market, since training firms
recruit by market criteria and demand has regularly exceeded supply of apprenticeship
contracts in recent years (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB) 2013b).
3 Data and Methodology
Our methodology closely resembles the one in Mühlemann et al. (2009) and uses standard
panel data methods to analyze the determinants of apprenticeship contracts at the re-
gional level. Using firm-level data might be interesting for the analysis of sector spectific
features. However, in this paper, we focus on the relation between aggregate variables.
The data we use consists of yearly information on offered apprenticeship contracts offered
from businesses between 1999 and 2012 from all 16 German federal states. Additionally,
for each state, we consider two variables related to the business cycle: the unemployment
rate and the growth rate of regional real income. In addition, we control for demographic
effects by considering demographic variables like the population of school leavers at age 16
and the number of first-year students. Descriptive statistics of the variables are provided
in table 1.
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Table 1: Description of the data
Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. Obs.
Appr. contracts 29647.53 29645.35 122109 4064 224
Income 1413.39 1408.22 5207.02 230.12 224
Income growth 0.41 2.25 6.34 -10.62 208
Unemployment 12.19 4.78 22.10 4.20 224
School graduates 58021.48 54779.17 223515 7029 224
First year students 24056.62 23152.23 120305 3060 224
Figure 1 shows the log number of new apprenticeship contracts together with the growth
rate of real income for each federal state. The visual inspection of the data reveals that
real income growth rates showed no trend over the sample period. In the west German
states, growth rates of real income decreased sharply during the economic crisis between
2007 and 2009. At the same time real income growth in the east German states remained
more or less stable, with the exception of Sachsen-Anhalt, where the drop in the growth
rate is small compared to the average decrease in the west German states. The rate
of unemployment together with the log number of new apprenticeship contracts in each
year for each federal state is displayed in figure 2. From 1999 to 2006/07, unemployment
rates remained on high levels and started to decrease thereafter. In our estimations, we
take these data characteristics into account by analysing corresponding sub-samples and
sub-groups.
6
-8-4048
10
.8
11
.0
11
.2
11
.4
20
01
20
06
20
11
Ba
de
n-
W
ür
tte
m
be
rg
-4-20246
11
.0
11
.2
11
.4
11
.6
20
01
20
06
20
11
Ba
ye
rn
-4-2024
9.
2
9.
3
9.
4
9.
5
20
01
20
06
20
11
Be
rli
n
-4-20246
8.
8
9.
0
9.
2
9.
4
20
01
20
06
20
11
Br
an
de
nb
ur
g
-1
0-50510
8.
2
8.
4
8.
6
8.
8
20
01
20
06
20
11
Br
em
en
-5
.0
-2
.50.
0
2.
5
5.
0
8.
9
9.
0
9.
1
9.
2
9.
3
20
01
20
06
20
11
H
am
bu
rg
-8-404
10
.2
10
.4
10
.6
10
.8
20
01
20
06
20
11
H
es
se
n
-2024
9.
0
9.
2
9.
4
9.
6
20
01
20
06
20
11
M
ec
kl
en
bu
rg
-V
or
po
m
m
er
n
-5
.0
-2
.50.
0
2.
5
5.
0
10
.6
10
.7
10
.8
10
.9
11
.0
20
01
20
06
20
11
N
ied
er
sa
ch
se
n
-5
.0
-2
.50.
0
2.
5
5.
0
11
.2
11
.4
11
.6
11
.8
20
01
20
06
20
11
N
or
dr
he
in
-W
es
tfa
len
-4-20246
9.
8
10
.0
10
.2
10
.4
20
01
20
06
20
11
Rh
ein
lan
d-
Pf
alz
-1
5
-1
0-505
8.
6
8.
8
9.
0
9.
2
20
01
20
06
20
11
Sa
ar
lan
d
-4-2024
9.
6
9.
8
10
.0
10
.2
20
01
20
06
20
11
Sa
ch
se
n
-5
.0
-2
.50.
0
2.
5
5.
0
9.
0
9.
2
9.
4
9.
6
20
01
20
06
20
11
Sa
ch
se
n-
A
nh
alt
-4-202
9.
5
9.
6
9.
7
9.
8
9.
9
20
01
20
06
20
11
Sc
hl
es
w
ig
-H
ol
ste
in
-5
.0
-2
.50.
0
2.
5
5.
0
9.
2
9.
4
9.
6
9.
8
10
.0
20
01
20
06
20
11
re
al 
G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
 in
 %
 p
.a.
 
lo
g 
nu
m
be
r o
f n
ew
 ap
pr
en
tic
es
hi
p 
co
nt
ra
cts
 (r
ig
ht
 sc
ale
)
Th
ür
in
ge
n
F
ig
ur
e
1:
A
pp
re
nt
ic
es
hi
p
co
nt
ra
ct
s
an
d
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
in
th
e
G
er
m
an
fe
de
ra
ls
ta
te
s
7
45678
10
.8
11
.0
11
.2
11
.4
20
01
20
06
20
11
B a
de
n-
W
ür
tte
m
be
rg
46810
11
.0
11
.2
11
.4
11
.6
20
01
20
06
20
11
B a
ye
rn
1416182022
9.
2
9.
3
9.
4
9.
5
20
01
20
06
20
11
B e
rl i
n
812162024
8.
8
9.
0
9.
2
9.
4
20
01
20
06
20
11
B r
an
de
n b
ur
g
1214161820
8.
2
8.
4
8.
6
8.
8
20
01
20
06
20
11
Br
em
en
8101214
8.
9
9.
0
9.
1
9.
2
9.
3
20
01
20
06
20
11
H
am
bu
rg
681012
10
.2
10
.4
10
.6
10
.8
20
01
20
06
20
11
H
es
se
n
12162024
9.
0
9.
2
9.
4
9.
6
20
01
20
06
20
11
M
ec
kl
en
bu
rg
-V
or
po
m
m
er
n
68101214
10
.6
10
.7
10
.8
10
.9
11
.0
20
01
20
06
20
11
N
ied
er
sa
ch
se
n
8101214
11
.2
11
.4
11
.6
11
.8
20
01
20
06
20
11
N
or
dr
he
in
-W
es
tfa
len
46810
9.
8
10
.0
10
.2
10
.4
20
01
20
06
20
11
Rh
ein
lan
d-
Pf
alz
681012
8.
6
8.
8
9.
0
9.
2
20
01
20
06
20
11
Sa
ar
lan
d
812162024
9.
6
9.
8
10
.0
10
.2
20
01
20
06
20
11
Sa
ch
se
n
12162024
9.
0
9.
2
9.
4
9.
6
20
01
20
06
20
11
Sa
ch
se
n-
A
nh
alt
68101214
9.
5
9.
6
9.
7
9.
8
9.
9
20
01
20
06
20
11
Sc
hl
es
w
ig
-H
ol
st e
in
8121620
9.
2
9.
4
9.
6
9.
8
10
.0
20
01
20
06
20
11
ra
te 
of
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
lo
g 
nu
m
be
r o
f n
ew
 ap
pr
en
tic
es
hi
p 
co
nt
ra
cts
 (r
ig
ht
 sc
ale
)
Th
ür
in
ge
n
F
ig
ur
e
2:
A
pp
re
nt
ic
es
hi
p
co
nt
ra
ct
s
an
d
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
in
th
e
G
er
m
an
fe
de
ra
ls
ta
te
s
8
A simple linear model that links the log-level of the number of apprenticeship contracts
ait to the growth rate of real income ∆yi,t−1 and to the unemployment rate uit is
ait = ci + θ∆yi,t−1 + δuit + x′itβ + εit (1)
where i indexes the federal state, i = 1, 2, . . . , 16, and t indexes the year, t = 1, 2, . . . , 14.
The variable ci accounts for unobserved heterogeneity among the federal states. It is
constant over time and may be correlated with income growth. For example, the ci’s
capture heterogeneity in the economic structures of the states. The vector xit comprises
demographic variables that might be correlated with the business cycle and that have an
impact on the number of apprenticeship contracts. Variation in the error-term εit stems
from changes in the educational framework in federal state i in year t, which are not
correlated with the business cycle and not autocorrelated (see e.g. Wooldridge 2002).
To meet concerns about the timing of the variables, we use the previous year’s growth
rate of real income in our regressions. New apprenticeship contracts are closed some
time before the usual start of the training year on the first of August. Therefore, we use
the previous year’s growth rate of real income as an indicator for the business cycle in
the beginning of the following year when, presumably, firms and apprentices form their
decisions on new apprenticeship contracts.
In equation (1) the coefficient θ measures the ceteris paribus percentage change of ap-
prenticeship contracts that is due to an increase in income growth by one percentage
point and δ measures the ceteris paribus effect of a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate. To obtain consistent estimates for θ and δ and to justify standard
statistical inference, the regressors in (1) have to be strictly exogenous given the unob-
served effect ci, meaning that once ∆yi,t−1, uit,xit and ci are controlled for, ∆yi,s−1, uis
and xis have no partial effects on ait for s 6= t. Strict exogeneity in terms of the errors
can be stated as
E(εit|∆yi1, . . . ,∆yiT , ui1, . . . , uiT ,xi1, . . . ,xiT , ci) = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , 16. (2)
Since we allow for state specific effects to capture unobserved fixed effects, we consider
strong exogeneity a justifiable assumption in our model.
4 Results
Table 2 summarizes estimation results for different specifications of our empirical model
(1). While the specifications in columns (1) to (3) of table 2 include only business cycle
variables, the regression presented in the last column is augmented with demographic
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Table 2: Estimated business cycle effects on the number of apprenticeship contracts, the
dependent variable is the number of apprenticeship contracts in federal state i in year t,
ait. The model includes state fixed effects. Sample period 1999-2012.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 11.11∗∗∗ 11.09∗∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗ 14.73∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.08) (0.08) (1.34)
Income growth 1.11 1.16 0.72
(1.20) (1.18) (0.97)
Unemployment rate 0.005 0.006 −0.03∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.02)
Log number of school graduates 0.22∗
(0.11)
Log number of first year students −0.55∗∗∗
(0.16)
Observations 224 224 224 224
Groups 16 16 16 16
Observations per group 14 14 14 14
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
‘∗’ (‘∗∗’,‘∗ ∗ ∗’) indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%, 1%).
control variables. In the specifications, in which income growth is included, its estimated
coefficient varies between 0.7 and 1.2. Thus, an increase in income growth by one per-
centage point would trigger an increase in the number of new apprenticeship contracts by
roughly one percent on average. However, as indicated by the relatively large standard
errors the income effect is not statistically significant.
An increase in the rate of unemployment significantly lowers the number of new ap-
prenticeship contracts in the specification where we control for the number of first year
students and the number of school graduates, see column (4). The estimated elasticity
of −0.03 is rather small, implying that the number of new apprenticeship contracts in
Baden-Württemberg, for example, would have been decreased by 16 on average in 2012
if the rate of unemployment would have been increased by one percentage point in that
year.
The estimated effect of income growth does not change substantially when the demo-
graphic control variables are included in the regression, see table 2 column (4). The effect
of the log number of school graduates is significant and shows the expected positive sign.
The estimated elasticities of the number of new apprenticeship contracts with respect
to the number of school graduates in a given year roughly correspond to the empirical
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observation that each year more than one third of school graduates start a dual training
programm on average. The relation between the log number of first year students and
new apprentices is negative and strongly significant, thus reflecting substitution effects
between university and firm level training.
Potential heterogeneity among the west and the east German states gives reason to split
the sample and to look for different effects in west and east Germany. More precisely,
we allow for different effects of income growth and unemployment in the east and west
German states by including corresponding interaction terms in the regressions. The
specifications additionally include the logs of the two control variables, the number of
school graduates and the number of first year students. Estimation results for different
sample periods are presented in the columns of table 3. Estimated income effects, given
in rows two and three of table 3, are not significant except for the sample period 2007-
2012 presented in the last column of table 3, where income growth has a positive effect
on the number of new apprenticeship contracts. While the estimated income effects are
similar for the west and the east German states there are some differences with respect
to the rate of unemployment. In the west German states we find significantly negative,
albeit small, effects of unemployment on the number of new apprenticeship contracts in
all subsamples. In the east German states the rate of unemployment is not significant
except for 2007-2012, where it has a negative effect on the number of new apprenticeship
contracts.
Taken together, the sub-sample results support our earlier impression that business cycle
effects on the number of new apprenticeship contracts are small in size and that their
statistical significance is rather weak. While we do not find any significant effects of
income growth during normal times for both east and west German states, changes in
the rate of unemployment significantly lower the number of new apprenticeship contracts
in the west German states but not in the east German states. In normal times, the
number of new apprenticeship contracts in the east German states is not affected by
business cycle fluctuations. In the west German states the number of new apprenticeship
contracts decreases with rising unemployment rates. Since the beginning of the financial
crisis in 2007, the number of new apprenticeship contracts moves in the same direction
as output growth in east and west Germany.
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Table 3: Estimated business cycle effects on the number of apprenticeship contracts
in east and west Germany for different sample periods. The dependent variable is the
number of apprenticeship contracts in state i in year t, ait. The model includes state
fixed effects.
Variable 1999-2012 1999-2006 2007-2012
Constant 16.37∗∗∗ 12.26∗∗∗ 10.74∗∗∗
(1.74) (2.85) (0.87)
Income growth, West 0.56 0.81 0.54∗
(0.93) (0.86) (0.31)
Income growth, East 1.09 2.07 1.16∗∗∗
(1.40) (2.31) (0.21)
Unemployment rate, West −0.04∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Unemployment rate, East −0.02 −0.03 −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Log no. of school graduates 0.11 0.51∗∗ 0.06
(0.11) (0.22) (0.07)
Log no. of first year students −0.58∗∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.16) (0.20) (0.01)
Obs. 224 128 96
Groups 16 16 16
Obs. per group 14 8 6
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
‘∗’ (‘∗∗’,‘∗ ∗ ∗’) indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%, 1%).
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5 Conclusion
This paper has analysed the short-run reaction of apprenticeship programs offered by
businesses to business cycle variables. Panel-data have been used for the German federal
states ranging from 1999 to 2012 to show that the impact of business cycle fluctuations
on the number of new apprenticeship contracts is weak and hardly significant on aver-
age. Hence, the apprenticeship system seems to have dampened the volatility of youth
unemployment in Germany. We also document the importance of demographic variables
in explaining the number of apprenticeship contracts.
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